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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The European Union (EU) cooperates closely with international partners in the areas of 
conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. As there are few places around 
the world where the EU operates as the only security actor, a better understanding of how 
the EU interacts with partners on the ground is critical. Indeed, the recent EU Global 
Strategy has made relations with partners a priority for EU external relations, including 
the EU's conflict response strategies. Coordination between partners is relevant, but it is 
even more important to examine how the EU and its partners can genuinely work together 
to achieve a unity of effort. 
This report analyses to extent to which the EU and other international organisations 
exchange civilian resources within target countries for the purpose of conflict prevention, 
crisis management and peacebuilding. The EU and international organisations, for 
instance, exchange material resources such as funding, personnel, and even equipment. 
Yet they can also provide non-material resources to each other, such as political or 
diplomatic support. To provide evidence of the synergies between the EU and its partners, 
we conduct a unique study of exchanges of civilian resources on the ground in Kosovo, Mali 
and Armenia. These are cases where the position of the EU varies from lead actor to 
important actor to secondary actor. 
Our analysis shows that what the EU and other international organisations bring to crises 
across the world is, largely, complementary. While there are the occasional conflicts, on 
the whole cooperation has been positive. At the same time, there is potential for further 
synergies. Coordination tends to take place at the operational and tactical level, whereas 
a genuinely joint strategic approach to crises is lacking. And when complementarities are 
achieved, they tend to be implicit and the result of parallel civilian missions rather than a 
truly collective and integrated approach.  
We also find that cooperation often takes place either via formal or informal channels, 
but not a combination of both. This is problematic as formal and informal channels offer 
complementary advantages. Formal channels for coordination allow for inclusivity and are 
permanent forums. Yet there is also a need for informal channels. These are efficient 
coordination opportunities in the event of political obstacles. But informal channels are 
largely people-driven and the approach of the international community cannot hinge 
solely on whether heads of mission are cooperative. 
Our research has revealed that the EU and other international organisations exchange 
resources extensively. At the same time, the exchange tends to be limited to financial 
resources and diplomatic and political support. The EU member states do make 
considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as the UN 
and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context. More recently, we have seen 
more ambitious resource exchanges. In Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely 
extensively on the UN mission support structure in the future. This goes beyond financial 
and/or diplomatic support. 
Finally, the EU does not always think in political and strategic terms about its contribution 
to the broader international community. It gets insufficient leverage from its financial 
contribution. Part of the problem is the EU's institutional fragmentation. Also, the EU 
should be more aware of how it is perceived among other international organisations. In 
Kosovo, Mali and Armenia, the image of the EU as a security actor is sub-optimal for 
various reasons, ranging from a lack of preferences (Kosovo), risk aversion (Mali), or the 
perception that the EU is more generously funded (Armenia). A greater awareness of such 
perceptions is needed and public diplomacy is relevant in inter-organisational relations. 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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy recommendation 1 (strategic approach) 
The joint strategic approach of international actors and organisations to conflict countries 
should be strengthened. Despite complementarities, international actors continue to work 
alongside each other and coordination on the ground is often limited to operational and 
tactical issues. Strategic discussions, including at headquarters, should be better 
coordinated with other international partners. 
Policy recommendation 2 (diplomatic support)  
The EU should further recognise the importance of political and diplomatic support for the 
activities of other international organisations. Backing up partners, for instance through 
statements from Brussels by the High Representative or the Council or on the ground by 
the local EU missions, can have significant effects at limited cost. It increases the 
authority of international partners. 
Policy recommendation 3 (coordination channels) 
There is a need for both formal and informal coordination channels between international 
actors and organisations in crisis regions. Informal channels rely on personalities, while 
formal channels can be limited in scope. Successful coordination requires both. Even when 
formal coordination meetings are perceived as less useful, EU officials are well-advised to 
make the investment and attend them at the appropriate level. 
Policy recommendation 4 (scope of capability exchange) 
The exchange of resources between international actors and organisations largely centres 
around funding and information exchange. There could be further efficiency gains through 
resource exchange in other domains, such as staff, equipment, and mission support. This 
could be discussed during the strategic coordination meetings, such as the EU-UN Steering 
Committee.  
Policy recommendation 5 (leveraging resources) 
There needs to be a more strategic approach to how the EU leverages its resources. As a 
result of institutional fragmentation within the EU and even within the EEAS, the funding 
of other international organisations does not necessarily result in political gain. This 
requires better intra-EU coordination and clearer lines of authority within the EEAS and its 
delegations. 
Policy recommendation 6 (managing perceptions) 
The EU should monitor how it is perceived by other international organisations to avoid 
damage to its reputation and to improve its inter-organisational public diplomacy. A 
general perception is that the EU does not always use its significant resources to the 
fullest extent, while other international organisations are pushed to their limits with 
fewer resources. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AFISMA   International Support Mission in Mali 
APF   African Peace Facility 
APSA   African Peace and Security Architecture 
ASF   African Standby Force 
ASIFU   All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit 
ATNP   Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process 
AU   African Union 
BiH   Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CAR   Central African Republic 
CSDP   Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSTO   Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DCAF   Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECHO   European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
EDF   European Development Fund 
EEAS   European External Action Service 
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   over Nagorno-Karabakh 
ERM   Early Response Mechanism 
EU   European Union 
EUCAP   European Union Capacity-Building Mission 
EUFOR   European Union Force 
EULEX   European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
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EUTM   European Union Training Mission 
ICITAP   International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
ICO   International Civilian Office 
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IcSP   Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
IPA   Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
KSF   Kosovo Security Forces 
MaAF   Malian armed forces 
MINUSMA  United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
   Mali 
MMA   Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising 
MoU   Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OCHA   United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ODIHR   Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OIC   Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
OSCE   Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PSO   Peace Support Operation 
RAP   Sahel Regional Action Plan 
REC   African Regional Economic Communities 
SMM   Special Monitoring Mission 
SSR   Security Sector Reform 
UN   United Nations 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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UNICEF  United Nations Children's Fund 
UNMIK   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNOM   United Nations Office in Mali  
UNOPS   United Nations Office for Project Services 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
UN WOMEN  United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
   Women 
UN-CMCoord  Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination office 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) has made cooperation with other partners, and particularly other 
international organisations, a priority in its external relations and its conflict response 
strategies (European Union 2016: 18, 33-37, 43). Synergies with the United Nations (UN), 
the African Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are critically important for the EU to 
promote its interests and values abroad. Importantly, while there is always a potential for 
competition between international actors, the interaction between the EU and other 
international organisations is largely based on complementarities. The mandates and 
scope of international crisis response missions vary and the EU generally adds unique value 
to the efforts of the international community (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr 2016). 
Interactions between the EU and other international actors have been the focus of 
attention for scholars and policy practitioners (e.g. Biermann and Koops 2017; Biermann 
2008; Kolb 2013; Hofmann 2013; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Tardy 2005). Despite the wealth 
of studies on inter-organisational relations covering a range of empirical case studies with 
increased theoretical sophistication, the full potential of the study of relations between 
the EU and other international organisations remains under-utilised. There are four key 
shortcomings in the academic and policy literature. First, many of the academic 
contributions centre around questions of competition or cooperation, which are simply too 
abstract to have much policy relevance. Second, many studies emphasise formal 
arrangements between international organisations, which tend to be only the tip of the 
iceberg. For a more accurate picture, informal arrangements need to be included into the 
analysis. Third, because of obvious practical reasons, many studies focus on interactions at 
the level of headquarters, even though the rationale for synergies may be in the field. 
Finally, many publications are based on case studies between one pair of international 
organisations (e.g. EU-NATO or EU-UN) rather than a more comprehensive analysis of 
interactions between multiple organisations and actors. 
In this report we focus on synergies from a more practical perspective. We analyse the 
extent to which the EU and other international organisations exchange civilian resources 
within target countries. Civilian resources include material resources such as funding, 
personnel, and even equipment, but also non-material resources such as information 
exchange and political or diplomatic support for initiatives by other international 
organisations. This question is important. First, as part of the broader EU-CIVCAP project, 
we are interested in the civilian resource base of the EU.  If the EU can help other 1
international actors and vice versa, there are important policy consequences. Second, as 
the EU Global Strategy moves towards resilience and more indirect forms of EU 
intervention, it is important to analyse how the EU can provide tangible support to other 
actors (Wagner and Anholt 2016; Juncos 2017). Third, from an organisation theory 
perspective, the exchange of resources and resource dependence drives interaction in the 
first place (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Harsch 2015). We can thus rely on a wide range of 
concepts and assumptions to inform this report. 
To provide evidence of the (potential) synergies between the EU and relevant other 
international organisations, uniquely we study exchanges of civilian resources on the 
 See, for more information: https://www.eu-civcap.net 1
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ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia.  The choice of these three case studies is informed by 2
the varying contributions that the EU makes to the international community. The EU is a 
lead actor in Kosovo through its Rule of Law (EULEX) mission, the EUSR and the EU Office. 
In Mali, the EU also has a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) presence and a 
development portfolio, but plays a secondary role compared to the UN peacekeeping 
mission. The EU's role in Armenia is much more limited, in the absence of a CSDP mission, 
and in light the key historical role of the OSCE as well as the Russian Federation. Such 
variation in case studies allows us to better appreciate dependencies and therefore the 
potential for synergies between the EU and other international organisations. All three 
case studies benefit from in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in those conflict 
countries. These include EU and international officials as well as local civil servants and 
experts.  3
To compare these different case studies, we have structured them along the same four 
issues. First, we provide an overview of the general (political) approach of the 
international community to the country and region. Second, we analyse the informal and 
formal division of labour between the international organisations in the relevant conflict. 
Third, the formal agreements, mechanisms for liaison and standard operating procedures 
between these organisations are discussed. Finally, we examine the exchange of 
capabilities and dependencies between these organisations. As such this report covers all 
the relevant dimensions of inter-organisational relations (formalisation, intensity, 
dependence, standardisation) (Marrett 1971; Aldrich 1977; Dijkstra 2017). This structure 
allows us to come to conclusions and recommendations informed by all three cases. 
The main findings of our report include: 
• The effort of the EU and other international organisations in crises across the world 
is largely complementary. There are naturally occasional conflicts between the EU 
and its partners, for instance during politically charged moments of mission 
handovers, but on the whole cooperation has largely been positive. There is a 
strong attempt at unity of effort, particularly in crisis regions. At the same time, 
there is potential for further synergies between the EU and other international 
organisations. A joint strategic approach for conflict regions and countries is 
lacking. Furthermore, when complementarities are achieved, they are largely 
implicit and the result of parallel civilian missions rather than a truly collective 
and integrated approach.  
• Cooperation between international organisations, at headquarters and on the 
ground, takes place through both formal and informal channels. It is not either/or. 
To achieve synergies among themselves, international actors need both. The 
advantage of formal channels for coordination is that they allow for inclusivity and 
are permanent forums. The absence of such channels, for instance, in Armenia in 
the security domain, is noteworthy. Yet there is also a need for informal channels. 
These allow for direct and efficient coordination opportunities, particularly in case 
of political obstacles. Kosovo is an example. But informal channels are largely 
people driven. The approach of the international community to peacebuilding in 
Kosovo cannot hinge solely on whether heads of mission are cooperative and go for 
 The focus of this report is largely the interactions among international organisations. This is not to deny, 2
however, the importance of other actors, particularly the individual EU member states and other countries. 
Indeed, it is difficult to understand international policy in Kosovo, Mali or Armenia without reference to lead 
actors such as the United States, France and Russia. These are naturally actors by themselves, with their own 
policies, but also the main principals within the relevant international organisations.
 See the complete list of 29 interviews at the end of this document.3
  9
                              DL 4.2 Partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding       
lunch together regularly. 
• Our research has revealed that international organisations exchange resources 
extensively. At the same time, the exchange tends to be limited to financial 
resources and diplomatic and political support. The EU member states do make 
considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as 
the UN and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context, which reduces 
EU leverage. More recently, we have seen more ambitious resource exchanges. In 
Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely, in the future, on the UN mission support 
structure. It is important to examine whether such a model can be applied also 
elsewhere. 
• Finally, despite its laudable efforts, the EU does not always think in political and 
strategic terms about its contribution to the broader international community. It 
is, for instance, not clear that it sufficiently leverages its financial contribution to 
other international organisations. Part of the problem is the EU's and the European 
External Action Service's (EEAS) institutional fragmentation, in which entirely 
different sets of actors are responsible for funding and policy. Also, the EU should 
be more aware of the negative perceptions it occasionally creates among other 
international organisations. Small-scale, token-like, EU missions are not always 
appreciated, if other international organisations make major efforts in a crisis. 
Similarly, on the ground, it is important that the EU makes use of its capabilities 
rather than constraining its capabilities with caveats. It is also important to 
understand that a well-resourced EU presence can create resentment among the 
staff of other international organisations.  
The importance of synergies between the EU and its partners cannot be overestimated. 
The EU, for instance, repeatedly notes its capacity for rapid response and its potential to 
reduce the warning-response gap.  This is potentially a valuable contribution for the 4
broader international community. Similarly, while the EU can, for example, focus on the 
short-term timeframe in crises (end-date), other international organisations can 
subsequently focus on the long-term, including through peacebuilding projects (end-state) 
and vice versa. Finally, the EU can achieve civil-military synergies by contributing a 
component to the wider presence of the international community. As such, it is critical for 
the EU to consider better how it can maximise its exchange of resources with other 
international organisations and optimise the joint performance of the international 
community. 
This report starts with a discussion of the bilateral cooperation channels between the EU, 
on the one hand, and the UN, NATO, AU and OSCE. This section builds on official 
documents and existing publications. It serves as a basis and a recap of all the interactions 
the EU has with other relevant international organisations. The report continues with case 
studies of how the EU cooperates with other international organisations on the ground in 
Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. As noted above, all the case studies have the same structure to 
allow for comparisons. The report concludes with general observations and policy 
recommendations on how the EU can improve its cooperation and synergies with other 
international organisations. 
 The warning-response gap, short-term versus long-term approaches, and civil-military synergies are key 4
cross-cutting issues in the wider EU-CIVCAP project. See further: https://www.eu-civcap.net 
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2. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
The majority of EU conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding activities do 
not take place in isolation; they are carried out in areas where other international 
organisations are also actively involved. This interdependence has been acknowledged by 
the EU in its Global Strategy, which commits it to work more systematically with both 
international and regional organisations on the ground (European Union 2016: 18, 33-37, 
43). The bilateral cooperation between the EU, on the one hand, and important partners, 
such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, and AU, on the other hand, is at various stages of 
development and formalisation. This first section of the report focuses on the 
formalisation and exchanges of resources between these organisations, mainly at the 
strategic level. Multilateral cooperation on the ground in selected crisis regions will be 
discussed in the second half of this report. Since other scholars have analysed the formal 
modalities of interaction between the EU and other international organisations, this 
section seeks to consolidate the existing literature. 
2.1. EU-UN COOPERATION 
2.1.1. General and institutional framework 
The EU’s partnership with the UN is the most developed of all the EU’s relationships with 
other international organisations (Tardy 2015). It is the outcome of the EU’s willingness to 
cooperate, resulting from its growing autonomous role in crisis management, which was 
reciprocated by the UN. Faced with increased deployments and complex crises during the 
2000s, the UN discovered the regional organisations as important partners (see e.g. UN 
Security Council 2005; UN Secretary-General 2009, 2015). The EU-UN cooperation has from 
the beginning been driven by the particular operations and missions, starting with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003. Following such 
operational experience, the EU and UN adopted a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis 
management, which identified four areas for coordination: planning, training, 
communication and best practices (Council of the European Union 2003a). A series of 
documents has followed, building on the initial declaration (Council of the European Union 
2007a; European External Action Service 2011; 2012; also Council of the European Union 
2004: Annex II). 
Beyond these conceptual documents, EU-UN cooperation is based on three pillars. First, 
the EU and UN adopt multi-annual strategic documents. The current document Strategic 
Partnership in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping: Priorities 2015-2018 lists a number 
of priorities for EU-UN cooperation such as rapid response, joint support for the AU, filling 
critical gaps in UN missions, partnerships, mission support, and enhanced information 
exchange. Second, the twice-yearly meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis 
Management provide overall guidance and these meetings are complemented by the 
cooperation on staff level. Third, the cooperation on the ground between missions is the 
final pillar of interaction (European External Action Service 2015). 
2.1.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities 
The EU has identified several possible modalities for its engagement with UN missions. 
First, it can serve as a clearing house for the UN troop and staff contributions of the 
member states. Second, it can provide a component to a UN operation (modular 
approach). Third, the EU can autonomously deploy in theatre in support of the UN 
(European External Action Service 2012). This final option can, in turn, involve several 
specific scenarios. These include a stand-alone EU mission mandated by UN Security 
Council (UNSC); an EU mission followed by the UN (bridging model, e.g. EU Force [EUFOR] 
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in the Central African Republic [CAR]); an EU operation taking over from the UN (e.g. EU 
Police Mission in BiH); the EU providing a strategic reserve to a UN peacekeeping operation 
(over the horizon troops, e.g. EUFOR DRC); or the EU and the UN dividing responsibility for 
civilian or military missions (e.g. EUSEC DRC) (Novosseloff 2012; Tardy 2005). 
Complementarities in the EU’s and UN’s peacekeeping activities make synergies beneficial 
for both organisations. On the one hand, the EU’s mostly small-scale missions, often 
deployed on a short-term basis, have most impact on the ground when they are part of a 
multinational presence, including a bigger UN mission which provides a strategic 
framework (e.g. in DRC and Chad) (Brosig 2011). Moreover, the EU’s cooperation with UN 
allows it to 'present its defence identity as part of a global collective security 
strategy' (Gowan 2009: 11). On the other hand, EU operations can provide much-needed 
temporary support and relief to UN missions as demonstrated, for instance, during the 
elections in DRC in 2006. However, the interests of the two organisations do not always 
overlap. This situation has sometimes led to operational and political frictions. For 
instance, the handovers in Chad and Kosovo were less than ideal (Dijkstra 2010, 2011). And 
the UN’s request for EU’s mission in DRC in 2008 went unheeded (Gowan 2009: 11). 
2.1.3. Sharing of resources 
The EU member states are collectively the biggest donor to UN peacekeeping operations 
(31.98% in 2017) (UN General Assembly 2015). Conversely, EU countries seem to be 
relatively reluctant personnel contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. In 2016, their 
share of deployed UN personnel in peacekeeping missions amounted only to 5,790 (or 
5.77% out of a total of 100,376).  This number should, however, be compared to 6,600 EU 5
staff participating in the CSDP missions (European External Action Service 2017: 9). One 
potential tool of relevance here are the EU’s Battlegroups, which can be deployed in 
response to a request from the UNSC. However, in spite of the UN’s interest, and the fact 
that it is the subject of consultations between the EU and the UN, including in the 
Strategic Partnership in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping: Priorities 2015-2018, the 
EU has so far not yet deployed them in support of UN missions (Reykers 2017). 
Besides peacekeeping contributions, the EU member states are also collectively the 
biggest donor to the general UN budget (30.38% in 2017 budget) (UN Secretariat 2016). 
Moreover, their level of voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes amounts to 
about half of all the voluntary contributions.  An important part of those contributions are 6
peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian assistance, which help to tackle the root 
causes of crises. Such contributions therefore have an indirect but considerable impact on 
international peacekeeping activities. 
2.2. EU-NATO COOPERATION 
2.2.1. General and institutional framework 
The EU and NATO share values and a largely similar membership, as 22 EU member states 
are also NATO members and five other participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The EU 
and NATO have similar understandings of external threats and, as far as the European 
members of NATO are concerned, they have access to largely the same capabilities (Michel 
2012). However, despite these similarities, EU-NATO cooperation has been shallow and has 
proved very challenging. 
 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml5
 See http://eu-un.europa.eu/about-the-eu-at-the-un/ 6
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The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 is the cornerstone document covering the modalities of 
EU's use of NATO capabilities for the EU's autonomous military actions. However, Berlin 
Plus had hardly been tried in tested in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
BiH, when Cyprus became an EU member state in May 2004. As a result of its own bilateral 
conflict with Turkey, EU-NATO cooperation has practically come to a halt. It currently only 
covers issues that fall under Berlin Plus, which only involves the EU military operation in 
BiH, which has been gradually downsized since 2006 (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2016). This 
long-term impasse seems to have been broken by the declaration signed at the NATO 
Warsaw Summit in 2016, which agreed on seven strategic areas in which the EU-NATO 
cooperation should be strengthened: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation 
including maritime issues; cyber security and defence; defence capabilities; defence 
industry and research; parallel and coordinated exercises and defence and security 
capacity building (European Commission 2016a). This declaration was followed by the 
adoption of a list of 40 proposals for its implementation in December.  The actual results 7
of this renewed cooperation attempt remain to be seen. 
2.2.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations 
Cooperation between the EU and NATO takes place on several levels. Firstly, Berlin Plus-
related cooperation is discussed at the joint ambassadorial meetings between North 
Atlantic Council and EU’s Political and Security Committee. Secondly, cooperation still 
exists (on paper) at lower levels. NATO has a Permanent Liaison Team operating in the EU 
Military Staff. The EU has a planning cell located at NATO's Supreme Allied Headquarters 
Europe. However, since the Cyprus-Turkey problem continues to provide political 
blockages, most of the real coordination of activities is carried out through informal 
contacts and channels. Notably the NATO Secretary-General regularly attends EU 
ministerial meetings (while not a formal member), while the EU High Representative 
attends NATO meetings. At staff levels there are exchanges facilitated by the fact that 
both organisations are located in Brussels. And importantly, informal cooperation has been 
developed on the ground (Michel 2012), including through the co-location of headquarters 
(Leakey 2006; Gebhard and Smith 2015).  
Several cooperation models have been so far deployed by the two organisations: (a) formal 
Berlin Plus agreements; (b) division of labour: a EU civilian mission complementing a NATO 
military operation (EULEX / Kosovo Force [KFOR], EU Police Mission / International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan); (c) parallel deployment of similar type of 
mission (counter-piracy missions off the Somali coast EU Naval Force [EUNAVFOR] 
Atalanta / NATO Ocean Shield); and (d) similar types of missions in the same theatre with 
complementary mandates (e.g. EU Operation Sophia and the recently deployed NATO Sea 
Guardian, mandated to provide support to Sophia). Moreover, the idea of 'Berlin Plus in 
reverse', NATO conducting civilian operations using EU’s capabilities, has been floated at 
several occasions (Michel 2012). 
The past Berlin Plus missions are an example of successful cooperation and 
complementarities between EU and NATO. Similarly, both complementary and parallel 
missions have been reported to work well together, thanks to pragmatic informal 
coordination, mostly on the ground. Moreover, in case of anti-piracy missions the 
cooperation is greatly facilitated by the use of international coordination channels with all 
the actors in the area (instead of bilateral contacts) and, importantly, co-location of 
operational headquarters of both operations in Northwood, United Kingdom. However, the 
necessity to continuously think of ad hoc solutions to overcome political blocks is a 
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm?selectedLocale=en 7
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considerable source of frustration on part of the personnel (Gebhard and Smith 2015).  
2.2.3. Sharing of resources 
The division of resources between the two organisations at the level of the member states 
is flexible as the same troops and capabilities are used to honour the commitments to 
both organisations. The two Berlin Plus missions are the only cases of official use of NATO 
resources by the EU. However, on the ground the two organisations unofficially assist each 
other with their resources. In Kosovo four draft technical agreements were negotiated to 
cover mutual support and both organisations informally agreed to abide by those drafts. In 
Afghanistan, agreements on physical protection of EU personnel by NATO was agreed 
between the EU and the relevant 'lead nation' within NATO (not NATO as an organisation). 
However, relying on such arrangements, without official agreements between EU and 
NATO, is still a major problem, hampering the work on the ground and adding to 
coordination problems (Smith 2011). 
2.3. EU-OSCE COOPERATION 
2.3.1. General and institutional framework 
The relationship between EU and the OSCE dates back to co-signing of Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 by the Commission and the rotating Presidency. Yet for most of this time the EU and 
OSCE did not have many contacts due to their different mandates. The inter-institutional 
contacts intensified in the 2000s following the development of the CSDP. As the EU became 
active in crisis management, the activities of the two organisations began to (potentially) 
overlap. The contacts between the EU and OSCE are facilitated by the fact that the 28 EU 
member states are also part of the 57 participating member members of OSCE. The EU 
member states normally coordinate their positions in OSCE and the EU behaves as a block. 
There is indeed a considerable overlap in the activities of the two organisations, due to 
similar definitions of external threats, objectives, geographical reach, and scope of 
activities. Overlap with the EU activities primarily falls within what for OSCE constitutes 
the human dimension of its security concept.  However, no general agreements have been 8
signed by the two organisations to govern their cooperation. Therefore, the EU is guided 
by its own 2003 Council draft conclusions, which identified five areas of potential 
cooperation: 'exchange of information and analyses, co-operation on fact-finding missions, 
co-ordination of diplomatic activity and statements, including consultations between 
special representatives, training, and in-field co-operation' (Council of the European Union 
2003b). A particularly concern during the 2000s has been whether the EU would 
appropriate the role of the OSCE in crises, particularly in the Western Balkans and the 
Southern Caucasus, thereby further draining the OSCE of its resources. As a result of the 
revival of the OSCE through its large-scale Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, 
this seems now less of a concern. 
2.3.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations 
Several contact opportunities have been created to facilitate cooperation between the EU 
and the OSCE. Besides EU’s presence in OSCE meetings in Vienna (both through its member 
states and in its own capacity), regular meetings take place at the level of Ministerial 
Political Dialogue, between the OSCE Secretary General and the EU High Representative, 
staff in the headquarters as well as between the OSCE field missions and the respective EU 
 OSCE’s concept also includes less-developed politico-military, and economic and environmental dimensions 8
(Van Willigen and Koops 2015).
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Delegations and the CSDP Missions.  9
The cooperation between EU and OSCE includes activities such as police reforms and 
training, inter-ethnic issues, and media and election monitoring. Yet there is scope for 
their further cooperation and building on each other’s respective strengths. One potential 
geographical area is Central Asia, where the OSCE has a stronger position and considerable 
expertise, as the countries in this region are OSCE members. This fact facilitates OSCE's 
activities, including the area of security and democracy promotion (Stewart 2008). A 
similar observation could also be made about the Southern Caucasus, with possibly the 
exception of Georgia. In addition, the recent OSCE mission in Ukraine creates incentives 
for close EU-OSCE cooperation. However, the overlap in activities, and the growing 
predominance of EU in the eastern neighbourhood, has also created some difficulties in 
relations between the two organisations. This includes limited information flows 
(particularly from the EU), in general slow progress in stepping up cooperation, and 
perhaps some jealousy on the part of the OSCE concerning the much better-funded EU. 
2.3.3. Sharing of resources 
EU member states are major contributors to the OSCE. In 2016, they contributed 70% of 
the OSCE's annual budget of €141.1 million and 57.47% of staff in the field operations. 
Moreover, both the EU and its member states contribute to extra-budgetary pledges and 
expenditures. In 2015, their pledges amounted to 56.8% of the total value of €25.5 million 
(OSCE 2016a). Indeed, the EU (excluding its member states) is consistently the single 
biggest extra-budgetary donor of the OSCE. The EU also donates equipment, such as cars, 
to the OSCE SMM in Ukraine. It is worth highlighting this mission, which is kept out of the 
normal OSCE annual budget due to its extraordinary size. In January 2017, the monitors 
from the EU member states comprised 403 out of a total of 688 monitors. It is therefore 
clear that the OSCE is strongly dependent on the resources of the EU and its member 
states. 
2.4. EU-AU COOPERATION 
2.4.1. General and institutional framework 
The EU’s cooperation with the AU is based on the EU’s premise that “[t]he primary 
responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African 
continent lies with Africans themselves” (Council of the European Union 2005). 
Cooperation started soon after the AU’s creation in 2002. With its broad mandate the 
organisation symbolised a new African willingness to engage in the crisis prevention, 
management and peacebuilding. EU-AU cooperation was further intensified through the 
adoption of the Africa-EU strategic partnership and of the Joint Africa-EU strategy in 2007, 
where 'peace and security' was designated as part of the priority areas. Current 
cooperation is covered by the Roadmap 2014-2017, adopted by the 4th Africa-EU Summit 
in Brussels in April 2014. It focuses on three elements: enhancing the political dialogue on 
peace and security, operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 
including the African Standby Force (ASF), and providing funding for African-led peace 
operations. Importantly, the EU’s support is not only aimed at the AU but also at the eight 
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2.4.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations 
The coordination between the EU and AU takes place on several levels, including the 
ministerial and Troika meetings, the joint meetings of the EU Political and Security 
Committee and AU Peace and Security Council, and the work of the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the AU. Coordination also includes staff contacts, such as the EU 
Delegation to the AU, the AU permanent mission to the European Union, and the missions 
in theatre. Overall, the shared EU-AU preference for African-led activities in Africa is a 
strong basis for the division of work between the EU and AU. Similar to the cooperation 
with the UN, the EU commits considerable funds to the AU. The EU prefers the AU to 
undertake large-scale operations instead of committing its own personnel (see e.g. Olsen 
2009). The EU can potentially complement AU operations with its own missions, such as 
the EU Training Mission in Somalia. 
The main instrument of EU support to the AU is African Peace Facility (APF). It was 
established in December 2003 at the AU's request. The APF is used for three purposes: 
funding African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), supporting long-term development 
and capacity building of the institutions of the APSA, and funding Early Response 
Mechanism (ERM), a tool to prevent crises and their escalation, through among others 
mediation efforts. The APF is a very substantial funding mechanism that largely keeps the 
AU's activities in the field of security afloat. 
2.4.3. Sharing of resources 
Through the APF, the EU is a principal donor for AU activities, in view of the scarce 
resources of the AU’s member states. The APF is funded through the European 
Development Fund (EDF) which does not constitute a part of the general EU budget. More 
than €2 billion were allocated to the APF in the period 2004 until 2016 (European 
Commission 2016b). Under the 11th EDF (2014-2016), the total committed amount is €900 
million. Since 2004, the division of funds between the three priorities has been as follows: 
89.9% for PSOs (€1 555 million);  7.59% for APSA (€131 million) and 1.74% for ERM (€30 10
million). However, this high level of financial commitments has become increasingly 
problematic, particularly in view of the EU’s discussions on using the development funds 
for APF, and the need to ensure sustainable funds for PSOs. Thus the EU has been making 
efforts to reach out to other potential contributors, including the African countries 
themselves. 
The APF is complemented by the regional programmes under the European Development 
Fund, the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the CSDP missions and 
bilateral cooperation on part of individual EU member states. Moreover, the EU and its 
member states are the biggest provider of official development assistance to the African 
continent, with approximately €20 billion per year.  Similarly to the EU’s assistance to the 11
UN (which is also to large extent focused on Africa), a large part of these funds tackles 
root causes of crises and therefore has an important complementary role to EU’s direct 
peacekeeping activities. 
 In 2015 the EU supported four African-led missions: AMISOM in Somalia; ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau; RCI-LRA in 10
Uganda, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan; and AFISMA in Mali.
 See http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/financing-partnership11
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2.5. CONCLUSION 
This first section on the EU's relations with other international organisations has 
highlighted considerable consultation and synergies. While there is variation in the density 
of interactions between the EU and its partners, with the EU-UN and EU-NATO relations 
perhaps more developed than the EU-AU and EU-OSCE relations, it is clear that the EU 
sees significant potential in cooperation with partners and that relations are largely 
complementary. It is important, however, to contrast the interactions at the headquarters 
and strategic level with the experiences in the field. To that end, the next sections 
provide evidence of three countries – Kosovo, Mali and Armenia – where the EU works to 
varying degrees with other international partners. These case studies show that while also 
on the ground relations tend to be cooperative, the data also show that there clearly is 
further potential for cooperation and particularly the exchange of relevant civilian 
capabilities.  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3. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN KOSOVO 
Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, after having been de 
facto independent since the NATO military intervention in 1999. Kosovo has been subject 
to state building by various international actors and its statehood still remains contested 
in the international community. The EU has become the primary international actor, 
particularly after 2008. Since the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 
2015, Kosovo is not only the focus of the EU peacebuilding policy, but of pre-enlargement 
policy as well. The EU also facilitates the high-level political dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina. Despite the prominent role of the EU, other international actors remain 
intensively engaged with Kosovo. While the EU has managed to use some of their 
capabilities, the overall strategic coordination between international actors still has 
plenty of room for improvement. 
3.1. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
During and following the civil war in Kosovo in 1998-1999, the international community – 
foremost NATO, the United States and several key western European countries – played a 
vital role in the developments that led to Kosovo's eventual secession from Serbia (King 
and Mason 2006; Papadimitriou, Petrov and Greicevci 2007; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Weller 2009; 
Perritt 2010; Koeth 2010; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012; Eckhard 2016). This has 
considerably influenced the position of the conflict parties towards the international 
community. At the same time, the international community does not have a single 
approach, particularly with respect to the question of Kosovo's status. Kosovo's 
independence is not only contested by Serbia but has also split the international 
community, including the membership of the EU, UN, NATO and the OSCE. Hence, 
international organisations have a limited space for formulating their policy towards 
Kosovo, which is seen as a major challenge to peacebuilding and development (e.g. 
Eckhard and Dijkstra 2017). International organisations therefore work on the basis of a 
'status neutral' mandate, which implies that they have to support the Kosovar institutions 
without prejudice to the formal status of Kosovo.  
Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, which was itself a republic in former 
Yugoslavia. Its population is mostly ethnic Albanian. Following the civil war and the NATO 
intervention, the international community negotiated a peace agreement in June 1999, 
which resulted in the withdrawal of the Serbian institutions from Kosovo and the 
deployment of an international civilian and security presence under United Nations 
auspices, as decided in UNSC Resolution 1244. The NATO-led KFOR provided the 
international security presence whose mandate included deterring renewed hostilities, 
demilitarising armed Kosovo Albanian groups and ensuring public safety “until the 
international civil presence can take responsibility for this task”. After the Serbian 
withdrawal, Kosovo was emptied of any form of governance and administration and the 
role of civilian presence was to fill that vacuum and facilitate state-building. The UN 
deployed a civilian presence, in this respect, through its United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its main tasks were to perform basic civilian 
administrative functions, maintain law and order promote the establishment of self-
government in Kosovo, and support the reconstruction of key infrastructure. 
After Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, the role of international 
community has remained substantial. That said, a transition took place in which the 
UNMIK presence was very significantly reduced, whereas the EU took over the leading role 
in civilian presence in the field as the EULEX mission was launched in 2008. The EU has 
also facilitated the political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina at the highest 
political level since 2011. 
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3.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
Since 1999, many international actors have been active in Kosovo. Informally, the United 
States has been by far the most influential actor. In the words of one interviewee, the 
“space left for the EU is really small compared to the US in terms of how much we owe 
it”, because “the US invested ninety per cent of the bombs”.  A government official notes 12
that the US-financed projects are easier to implement because the US embassy can use its 
influence “if something goes wrong”.  A foreign diplomat has remarked that “because of 13
the US involvement here, they [the Kosovo authorities] instinctively trust the 
Americans”.  Even when asked by the EU to align certain legislation with EU standards, 14
the Kosovo authorities tend to double-check with the US embassy first if they could do 
that.  It is therefore not surprising that the US is a key partner with respect to major 15
political developments. The United States has been active in the broadest range of fields 
relevant for peacebuilding, from support to security sector reform (SSR), to mediation and 
support for local level dialogue projects, to development assistance.  
Through UNMIK, the UN has also played a central role in Kosovo since 1999. Interestingly, 
for the purpose of this report, UNMIK did not rely solely on UN capabilities. Instead, it 
established a system of four so-called pillars with United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) providing humanitarian assistance, the UN civil administration, OSCE 
democratisation and institution building, and EU reconstruction and economic 
development. This umbrella model was therefore geared toward synergies and different 
international organisations adding value. The UNMIK model was abandoned after 2008, 
following the unilateral declaration of independence and the adoption of a new 
constitution, when the functions of rule of law transitioned from the UN to EULEX (Dijkstra 
2011). There is a widespread perception that the UNMIK has outlived its mandate and 
ceased to be a relevant actor in Kosovo.  However, its continuing albeit very small 16
presence is still strongly supported by the UN members that do not recognise Kosovo 
independence.  17
Apart from UNMIK, the UN system comprises several agencies, funds, programmes and 
affiliates, such as UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations 
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN WOMEN). A particularly 
notable actor is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides 
support for democratic governance and peacebuilding, including support for the rule of 
law initiatives, small arms and light weapons control and setting up municipal safety 
councils in several municipalities.   18
The EU presence in Kosovo was initially limited to reconstruction and economic 





 Interviews #7 and 9.16
 Interview #7.17
 The overview of ongoing and past projects under Democratic Governance and Peacebuilding available at 18
http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance.html, 
accessed 4 April 2017.
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more significant political role (Solana and Rehn 2005a, 2005b). It was generally understood 
that the EU would take the lead, after independence, in terms of capacity building in the 
area of the rule of law (see Dijkstra 2013: 169). In 2006 preparatory teams for the future 
EU presences were established (Council of the European Union 2007b). The international 
community, for instance in the context of the Ahtisaari plans of 2007, to a large degree 
followed the 'BiH template', with an International Civilian Office (ICO) to be set up and led 
by an International Civilian Representative (ICR) with vast political authority. While the 
ICR would represent the international community, the function would be 'double-hatted' 
with the position of the EUSR for Kosovo implying that the EU would indirectly take the 
lead. Due to the ultimate lack of consensus among the international community over 
Kosovar independence, the ICO was eventually only established in 2008 as an institution 
representing those countries that recognised Kosovo. This immediately put the ICO at odds 
with the EU, which was to be status neutral, and therefore caused several headaches for 
the double-hatted ICR/EUSR. The ICO was closed in 2012.   19
Currently, the EU is present through the EU Office, whose head is at the same time EUSR, 
and the EULEX mission launched in 2008 (Council of the European Union 2008). The EU 
Office is engaged politically and with projects, such as Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) funding which also includes rule of law and public administration reform. 
EULEX has two objectives: 'Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA)' of the local Kosovar 
authorities as well as a limited set of 'Executive' functions in cases of serious crimes (war 
crimes, organised crime, corruption, etc.) (ibid.: Articles 2 and 3(d)). Following the 2014 
extension of the EULEX mandate, it no longer takes on new cases and gradually hands over 
its remaining competencies to the Kosovo judicial system, with the exception of north 
Kosovo, where EULEX will remain in charge until a solution is found in the context of the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (EULEX n.d.). 
NATO has led the military peace-supporting operation KFOR since 1999 as well as the 
Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Serbia. Furthermore, the NATO Advisory Liaison Team, situated in the Ministry for Kosovo 
Security Forces headquarters, has an advisory role in the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) 
capacity building (Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces 2016). Through KFOR, NATO 
remains the ultimate guarantor of security and stability in Kosovo and also provides 
security support to the other international organisations. 
The OSCE has been active in Kosovo since the early 1990s. In 1992, it set up a mission in 
the three regions of Serbia with significant minority populations (Kosovo, Sandjak and 
Vojvodina), but was forced out within a year (OSCE 2016b: 50-51). In autumn 1998, a new 
OSCE verification mission was established in agreement with Serbian authorities to 
monitor compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UNSC Resolution 1199, which called for a 
ceasefire, an improved humanitarian situation and a political solution to the Kosovo 
conflict. The Mission was withdrawn in March 1999, shortly before the beginning of the 
NATO intervention (ibid.: 54-57). After the intervention, the OSCE returned as the 
coordinator of the democratisation and institution-building pillar under UNMIK. The OSCE 
mission continues to work in the areas of human and community rights, democratisation 
and public safety. 
3.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
In Kosovo, international actors rely on five mechanisms for coordination: 1) memorandums 
of understanding; 2) liaison and coordination officers; 3) regular meetings; 4) participation 
in working groups and consultations coordinated by Kosovar institutions; and 5) informal 
 For a comprehensive report on ICO work in Kosovo, see ICO 2012.19
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communication. Not all of these mechanisms are equally utilised, with informal 
communication appearing as more important than formal mechanisms. 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed between some international 
organisations, but do not appear as a regular tool for arranging inter-organisational 
relations, nor do they imply coordination at a more strategic level. KFOR has MoUs with 
the UNMIK and EULEX, but these are described as evacuation plans for UNMIK and EULEX 
international employees “in case something happens”.  OSCE has separate MoUs with two 20
UN agencies, UNHCR and UNDP.  However, formal agreements have generally not been 21
recognised as necessary by international actors. What is more, the UNSCR 1244 still 
formally serves as a basis for the division of labour and coordination among international 
organisations in the field, influencing perception among some internationals that no 
further formal documents are needed as everything is set in the resolution.   22
KFOR has liaison officers with UNMIK, UNDP, UNHCR, EULEX, EU Office and OSCE. In 
addition, the NATO Advisory Liaison Team has an officer whose task is to coordinate KSF 
capacity-building activities implemented by different international actors.  UNMIK has a 23
civil-military liaison office which coordinates with KFOR. 
International actors meet regularly through several meeting channels. The best known are 
UNMIK interagency Monday morning meetings, which started as executive committee 
meetings gathering heads of pillars and senior KFOR representatives. In the meantime, 
EULEX and Council of Europe representatives have also been included 'on board'. However, 
Monday morning meetings have been described by representatives of various international 
actors as rather futile and a leftover from the pillar structure.  Only UNMIK and OSCE 24
currently send heads of missions to these meetings, while other participating organisations 
are represented by lower-level staff such as political officers.  Regular meetings among 25
chiefs of staff of five international organisations, EU Office, EULEX, OSCE, UNMIK and 
KFOR are organised.  
These meetings are not used for strategic planning, but to discuss more practical issues, 
such as situational relations and staffing.  EU, EULEX, the International Criminal 26
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and UNMIK have monthly coordination 
meetings at which they share information on their work with Kosovo Police. The EU Office 
also holds monthly meetings gathering the heads of missions of the member states as well 
as the head of EULEX. In the rule of law area, UNMIK, EU Office, EULEX, OSCE and the 
United States have their own working group. At the local level, there are Tuesday morning 
interagency security meetings in Mitrovica. Despite the organisation of all these regular 
formal meetings, it appears, however, that the most important interactions between the 
heads of missions take place over ad hoc informal lunches.  
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places where international actors' work is coordinated. The Ministry for European 
Integrations has a department that coordinates development assistance in various sectors, 
including the rule of law. The scope of coordination encompasses not only bilateral 
donors, but international organisations as well. In addition, each ministry has an internal 
unit for aid coordination. However, in the rule of law sector coordination remains a major 
challenge, in particular when a number of donors “want to get their hands on certain 
legislation”.    27
It appears that the bulk of communication among international actors runs informally. 
Crucial for UNMIK's relation with ICO and, to some extent, EULEX was the fact that the 
latter employed many former UNMIK staff.  On the other hand, interpersonal tensions 28
between UNMIK and EULEX are said to have made cooperation between the two missions 
quite uneasy at the beginning of the EULEX mandate.  The physical proximity of offices is 29
regarded as important for efficient communication and coordination.  The size of Pristina 30
and the limited number of places frequented by internationals is deemed to be a factor 
facilitating communication: “This is a small city. They [internationals] meet in the same 
restaurants; everyone knows what everyone else is doing”.  31
Despite having several coordination mechanisms, the locals’ perception is that the 
internationals do not coordinate much.  If they do, it is on political matters and not in 32
regard to technical project funding.  Coordination seems to be implemented on ad hoc 33
basis and joint planning at strategic level is missing, either when it comes to security 
(there are even no joint threat assessments)  or when it comes to development. With few 34
formal agreements, there are no clear procedures and coordination depends on individual 
initiative. Leadership in missions has been singled out as a factor contributing to 
coordination or lack of it: with heads of missions meeting over lunch, but not engaging in 
any joint strategic planning, there is hardly a basis for lower-level staff to develop 
working relations.  35
3.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES 
In spite of the identified coordination deficiencies, the international actors have found 
ways to effectively exchange capabilities and manage dependencies. Three prominent 
instances of such exchange are monitoring and reporting, funding and co-funding 
activities, and 'logo switching' i.e. channelling certain programmes through an organisation 
whose stance on Kosovo status is most adequate for the purpose.  
The EU Office makes use of the OSCE and UNMIK (in the case of North Kosovo) presence in 
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exchange. The OSCE and UNMIK field offices monitor the position of minorities in 
particular.  The information from the OSCE and UNMIK monitoring reports is integrated 36
into the reports that the EU Office sends to the EEAS. The OSCE also contributes to the 
reports of the UN Secretary-General on UNMIK by providing inputs on the situation in the 
field.  37
International actors often co-fund particular projects or even take over follow-up projects 
started by other international actors when they run out of money. It is not unusual that, 
for instance, one international organisation brings over an expert to deliver training, but 
has no money for a follow-up study visit, which is then financed by someone else.  The EU 38
relies on implementing partners, foremost UN agencies and the Council of Europe for the 
projects it funds in Kosovo. There are no clear guidelines for selecting an implementation 
partner, but it depends on the field of work and capacities of an international actor. The 
position of international organisations towards the status of Kosovo also plays an 
important role. For instance, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has been 
selected by the EU to construct border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo (UNOPS n.d.). 
Construction of the crossings falls under the implementation of the Integrated Border 
Management agreement, reached in the framework of the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue. The UNOPS has been assigned this task, both owing to its previous experience 
and knowhow, but also because the UN is status-neutral and thus a UN agency is more 
acceptable for Serbia.  39
This reasoning has paved the way for a specific type of exchange, which could be 
described as 'logo switching'. International organisations tend to shift visible support for 
certain programmes, depending on which side in conflict they are primarily seeking to 
address. The UN flag is auspicious for the Serbian side, but on the other hand, UNMIK does 
not enjoy popularity among central authorities in Pristina. There have been instances of 
UNMIK and OSCE co-organising an event, when UNMIK would provide more funding, but 
only the OSCE logo would be visible, in order to attract Kosovar institutions.  Similarly, 40
the EU may use its logo to lend support to the other international organisations, even if it 
is not funding their activities. For instance, the EU provided the Media Justice 
Transparency Initiative of the OSCE with such support, while its contribution was limited 
to the simple participation of EULEX judges in panel discussions among Kosovar judiciary 
and journalists. 
When observing the EU’s engagement in Kosovo in comparison with that of other 
international organisations, there is an impression that the EU wields relatively high 
political influence and has the most funds, but that it relies on other international 
organisations for field presence and project implementation. The EU has been criticised by 
some international officials for shunning the leadership role in the international 
community, despite having the strongest mandate and the most money at it disposal.  41
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4. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN MALI 
In 2012, a spillover of Tuareg fighters from a collapsed Libya reignited the longstanding 
Tuareg and Arab armed struggle for independence of the northern Malian provinces, 
collectively known as Azawad (see Shaw 2013; Zounmenou 2013; Sabrow 2017). The 
rebellion was initially met with restraint and an attempt at containment by Malian 
President Amadou Toumani Touré. Such an approach had settled similar disputes in 2006 
and 2009 without antagonising the neutral Tuaregs (Rabasa et al. 2011: 151–155; 
Zounmenou 2013). This time around, however, the defensive approach put a significant 
strain on the Malian armed forces (MaAF). President Touré was deposed through a coup 
d'état by military officers for his alleged mishandling of the insurgency and for failing to 
provide adequate resources for the military ('Mali mutiny' 2012; Oluwadare 2014). The 
coup backfired for the MaAF, as an insurgent rag-tag alliance of Tuareg nationalists and 
Islamist groups exploited the disruption of government and quickly seized the provincial 
capitals of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. By 6 April 2012 the insurgents proclaimed Azawad as 
an independent state ('Tuaregs claim', 2012; Sabrow 2017: 171; Luengo-Cabrera 2013). 
Following the immediate condemnation of the coup by the international community, an 
agreement was reached, mediated by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), whereby both the coup-makers and the incumbent President Touré would resign 
to allow power to pass to an interim government. ECOWAS would then deploy UN-
mandated troops in support of Malian territorial integrity (ECOWAS 2012; Oluwadare 
2014). This became the impetus for an extensive international involvement with the aims 
of preserving Malian territorial integrity, disrupting Islamist terrorism in the northern 
territories and rebuilding a functional state authority and security services (Ramsbotham 
et al. 2016; Oluwadare 2014). 
4.1. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The presidency of Amadou Touré had been perceived as a period of general stability in Mali 
(Rabasa et al. 2011: 151–155; Sabrow 2017). With his sudden fall in 2012, the need for 
immediate international support to prevent state collapse and the secession of Azawad 
became obvious. ECOWAS, with the support of France, proposed an immediate 
intervention force which was put into effect through UNSC Resolutions 2071 and 2085. It 
resulted in the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA) from January 2013, mandated inter alia to rebuild the capacity of the Malian 
Defence and Security Forces and support Malian authorities in recovering the terrorist-held 
areas of the north in order to transition to stabilisation activities, assist in protecting the 
population and create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
(ibid.; Oluwadare 2014).  
After six months, AFISMA transferred authority to the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA simultaneously subsumed the 
former United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) to act as an integrated UN presence. It also 
included a UN country team to coordinate all activities of UN agencies, funds and 
programmes and provide a coordinating basis for the general efforts of the international 
community (UNSC Resolution 2100). The most recent version of MINUSMA's mandate tasks 
the mission to provide security, stabilisation and protection of civilians and to support 
national political dialogue and reconciliation, re-establishment of state authority, 
rebuilding of the Malian security sector, promotion and protection of human rights, and 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNSC Resolution 2164). 
In line with UNSC Resolution 2085 and the subsequent mandate updates, the Malian 
government – and implicitly AFISMA and MINUSMA – has been supported by French national 
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counter-terrorist operations. The French Operation Serval, which lasted from 2012 to 
2014, was dedicated to ousting Islamic militants specifically in northern Mali. The 
subsequent Operation Barkhane expanded the focus to regional counter-terrorism across 
the Sahel. French counter-terrorism operations have worked in conjunction with US and 
NATO Special Operations Forces in building local capacities and conducting multinational 
training exercises and operations across the region ('US-led exercise in Chad', 2015; United 
States Africa Command n.d.). 
With respect to the CSDP, the EU initially launched the mission EU capacity-building 
mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger to support capacity building of Nigerian security actors to 
fight terrorism and organised crime and improve regional coordination of security 
challenges – namely between Niger, Mauretania and Mali (Council of the European Union 
2012b). A few days after its approval in July 2012, the Council noted that the rapidly 
deteriorating security situation in Mali was having a negative impact on regional and 
international peace and stability. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy was tasked to provide specific proposals for immediate actions to remedy the 
situation as envisioned in the Sahel strategy (Council of the European Union 2012a), 
leading to the launch of EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali in February 2013 and of EUCAP 
Sahel Mali in March 2014 (Council of the European Union 2013a; Council of the European 
Union 2014). EUTM Mali is mandated to provide advice and training to MaAF, whereas 
EUCAP Mali provides advice and training to the three components of Malian internal 
security forces: the police, gendarmerie and National Guard. 
In addition to its CSDP missions, the EU is engaged in Mali through its Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel (European Commission 2011), recently becoming the Sahel 
Regional Action Plan (RAP) (Council of the European Union 2015). The RAP is implemented 
through the EU Delegation in Bamako overseeing parts of EU National Indicative 
Programmes wherein €615 million has been pledged for 2014-2020 towards peace 
consolidation, state reform, rural development, food security, and education and 
infrastructure (European Union & Government of the Republic of Mali 2015). In addition, 
Mali receives approximately €40 million in yearly humanitarian assistance from the 
Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO). In total, the EU and its member states provide a combined €660 million annually, 
making up more than 50% of the overall assistance to Mali (European External Action 
Service 2016). 
4.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
Throughout the conflict in northern Mali, the AU and neighbouring ECOWAS countries have 
played a central role as mediators and negotiators, brokering several ceasefires with 
conflict parties. Most significantly the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 
May 2015, which included most of the political opposition groups as signatories, 
effectively isolating remaining Islamist terrorist groups from the larger Tuareg 
insurgency.  The international community has welcomed African responsibility and has 42
followed through with significant support to the initial intervention and ongoing mediation 
(UNSC Resolution 2100: 3; Council of the European Union 2013a). France, as the former 
colonial power in the region, has been instrumental both within the UN and the EU to 
ensure the deployment of considerable missions, after its unilateral operation Serval and 
Barkhane. As such France remains one of the most important, if not the most important 
actor, in the country. 
With the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA, the UN has taken on the lead role 
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in counter-insurgency, the protection of civilians and establishing a framework for the 
coordination of other international actors. Key parts of the Resolutions 2085 and 2100 
mandates, specifically training of military and internal security forces, has been taken up 
by the EU, while national support to direct counter-terrorism operations has been 
provided by United States, France and other NATO countries. The majority of humanitarian 
assistance to Mali is coordinated through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), although several international NGOs are still operating 
relatively independently of OCHA coordination mechanisms.  
There is a clear division of labour, on military matters, between the MINUSMA Military 
Component and EUTM, as MINUSMA is not directly involved with capacity building and 
training of MaAF.  The division of labour is, however, less clear, on police matters, 43
between the MINUSMA Police Component and EUCAP, as the MINUSMA Police Component 
includes a capacity-building pillar as part of its mandate.  In practical terms, EUCAP 44
training has focused mostly on strategic and national level training of internal security 
force leadership, whereas MINUSMA Police Component mainly engages in capacity building 
at the tactical level, focusing on operational units and specialists' training. There are, 
however, several overlapping areas as both missions also conduct basic police training 
programmes. UN police officers and EUCAP experts therefore regularly work in the same 
locations and often conduct trainings together.  45
4.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Following the eruption of the conflict in 2012, a Joint Task Force for Mali was established 
by the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the UN (UNSC Resolution 2100: 3). This task force, and the 
subsequent Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali formed by the AU Peace 
and Security Council, with UN, EU and ECOWAS, has sought to coordinate a coherent 
international initial response to the conflict (UNSC Resolution 2100: 3). The overarching 
framework for international support became Resolution 2085 and currently Resolution 
2164, under which MINUSMA has taken on responsibility for coordinating international 
support with respect to the stabilisation of Mali. This is mirrored in the mandates for EUTM 
and EUCAP Mali, where both missions are tasked to coordinate and harmonise their actions 
with MINUSMA and other international actors (Council of the European Union 2013b: 5; 
Council of the European Union 2014: 6). 
This has led to a construct whereby links have been established between the EU 
Delegation and MINUSMA mission leadership, between EUTM and the MINUSMA Military 
Component, and between EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component. In addition, there are 
internal coordination mechanisms between the EU Delegation and the two CSDP missions. 
All three EU missions have links of varying strengths and intensity with the humanitarian 
community and development actors, as well as with the EU member states directly 
supporting mission mandates in Mali.  46
The EU Delegation chairs a weekly meeting in Bamako, where the EU Heads of Mission for 
EUCAP and EUTM and member states' representatives coordinate engagements at the 
 Interviews #13, #15 and #20.43
 Interview #16.44
 Interviews #16, #18 and #19.45
 Interviews #13, #15, #16, #17, #18, #19 and #20.46
  26
                              DL 4.2 Partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding       
national level.  Additional lower level coordination is conducted on an ad hoc basis, 47
typically based on relevant operational coordination, such as the provision of equipment 
for MaAF from individual member and non-member states, and EUTM conducting 
subsequent training and equipment familiarisation.  The unilateral contributions of 48
individual member states and non-member states, such as the United States and 
Switzerland, are particularly significant as, so far, the EU does not have the mandate to 
provide local forces with equipment.  
The leadership of international military component – specifically MINUSMA Force 
Commander, Commander EUTM and Commander of operation Barkhane – meets at bi-
weekly intervals to coordinate at the operational and national military level.  At lower 49
levels, an exchange of liaison officers has been established between MINUSMA Military HQ 
and EUTM.  And, to coordinate intelligence assessments, a direct coordination and 50
exchange of information has been established between EUTM and the MINUSMA All Source 
Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU). The ASIFU is tasked with collecting, analysing and 
providing military intelligence products to MINUSMA and relevant partners, including 
embassies and the EU delegation. To avoid a potential inflation of validity assessments on 
duplicate intelligence reports, military analysts and subject matter experts informally 
coordinate between mission headquarters. There is no formal structure for this interface 
and sharing of information. It is managed on an ad hoc basis between individual subject 
matter experts and analysts.   51
With respect to police, a strategic meeting is held quarterly between EUCAP Head of 
Mission and MINUSMA Police Commissioner to identify strategic objectives and possible 
actions at political and national levels to support mandate implementation. At lower 
levels, a monthly technical meeting is held between EUCAP Head of Operations and 
MINUSMA Deputy Police Commissioner where all ongoing and planned operations are 
examined to avoid duplication of efforts, create complementarities and identify partners 
for projects and funding. On a by-project and location basis ad hoc coordination is 
conducted between the UN international police officers and EUCAP experts, where close-
coordinated cases meetings takes place several times a week.  52
In addition to formal and informal meeting structures, liaison officers have been 
appointed to improve communication between EUTM and the MINUSMA military 
headquarters, between EUCAP and the MINUSMA Police Component, and between EUTM 
and the humanitarian community. Between the EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component, 
the liaison exchange has been fruitful,  whereas the exchanges between EUTM and 53
MINUSMA Military Component have met challenges in terms of lacking transparency for 
external partners and issues with security clearances when the MINUSMA liaison officer is 
not from an EU member state.  For instance, during the fieldwork period in the autumn 54
of 2016, the appointed MINUSMA liaison officer to EUTM was not allowed independent 
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access to the EUTM headquarters,  and the EUTM appointed liaison officer to the 55
humanitarian community was unknown by OCHA’s Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination 
office (UN-CMCoord) and instead coordinated directly with individual actors.  56
As part of a shared interest by EUTM and MINUSMA to have the training of MaAF conducted 
closer to their areas of operation, EUTM and MINUSMA have gone through extensive 
negotiations and planning for an MoU in which MINUSMA may provide logistical support and 
local facilities for EUTM to extend their presence into Gao and Kidal as part of its newest 
mandate.  The decision to allow EUTM to move out into the northern sectors has been 57
long underway, and implementation has suffered delays, primarily from coordinating the 
extensive support required from MINUSMA Mission Support Division.  It has not been 58
straightforward to put the necessary exchange of capabilities in place. 
  
In general, external partners to the EU tend to state that there are well-functioning 
formal mechanisms for coordination, and that flexible ad hoc solutions are established 
when necessary. Their key points of concern have had little to do with challenges at the 
operational level but are focused much more on structural challenges within CSDP mission 
mandates and their restrictions (see further below).  Previous research has suggested 59
challenges from the high staff turnover caused by the CSDP six-monthly rotations, but all 
external parties included have stated the CSDP personnel have conducted effective 
transfers and hand-overs with little effect on operational continuity (Jayasundara-smits 
2016).  60
4.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES 
There is a significant exchange of capabilities between MINUSMA, EUTM and EUCAP. Links 
have been established between the Military and Police Components of MINUSMA and the 
respective corresponding CSDP mission. There have been successful exchanges and 
coordination of specific training requirements for Malian security actors from MINUSMA to 
the EU training missions.  The MINUSMA Force is conducting coordinated and combined 61
missions with Malian forces. As such it has a significant dependency on EUCAP and EUTM 
training quality and content.  While there has been an observably positive response from 62
both EUCAP and EUTM to suggested training requirements being put forward by MINUSMA, 
significant concerns have been voiced towards the lack of on-ground training and follow-
up from both CSDP missions. Particularly strong emphasis, from the UN perspective, is on 
the risk averseness by EUTM.   63
The MINUSMA Military Component is satisfied with the cooperation provided within the 
scope of the EUTM mandate, but a key problem identified is the fact that the current 
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EUTM mandate prevents qualified training and follow-up with Malian forces, because the 
EUTM trainers are not permitted to follow them on operations. A particularly striking 
example of EUTM risk averseness (to avoid casualties) is the observation that even EUTM 
Head of Mission could not join the MINUSMA Force Commander for a field visit outside 
Central Mali without previous approval from Brussels.  The net result is significant 64
damage to the reputation of EU missions when they are perceived by other international 
actors to have extensive resources and capabilities at hand, but remain unwilling to put 
them to maximal effect on the ground. An observation leading a key MINUSMA officer to 
label EU’s risk averseness as “laughable”.  Similar levels of risk assessment therefore 65
seem significant for effective inter-organisational relations. 
For its renewed mandate, EUTM will be largely dependent on MINUSMA Mission Support 
Division for logistical support in the transport and sustainment of both equipment and 
personnel to the training bases in Gao and Timbuktu. Progress in this area has been slow 
and the exact modes of coordination and support were still under negotiation during the 
research for this report. Such close cooperation between a UN logistics component and EU 
missions is likely to provide valuable lessons for future praxis and warrants a more 
detailed analysis in future research.  66
For the cooperation between EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component, UN officials state 
that the exchange of capabilities has been between equals and of a satisfactory 
standard.  EUCAP staff, on the other hand, voiced concern about the quality of UN 67
training. They also expressed a tendency from UN officials to approach EUCAP mainly for 
funding and support in complex training tasks that they were either unwilling or incapable 
of completing themselves.   With respect to the objective of achieving actual synergies in 68
the international community, such perceptions are not particularly helpful.  
In the humanitarian community, there is a sense of non-reciprocity in relation to EUTM and 
EUCAP. Cooperation is generally perceived as positive towards the EU delegation, but 
concerns were raised that neither EUTM nor EUCAP were reporting their interactions with 
local communities and active community support allegedly conducted along with their 
training activities. This has resulted in difficulties for OCHA and humanitarian actors in 
their deconflicting operations. Although both missions have frequented the weekly OCHA 
CMCoord meetings, their interaction is considered one-directional by external partners. 
Concerns have been raised whether information received at these humanitarian 
coordination meetings make their way into EU intelligence products, which may 
compromise humanitarian actors in the field if shared with MaAF.  This tension is likely to 69
increase as EUTM move activities to Timbuktu and Gao in the north. 
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5. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN ARMENIA 
The long-lasting conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has affected Armenian 
security policy for nearly three decades. While Armenia is not an international priority, the 
EU and other international organisations are active in the field of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. The EU provides political support for the peace negotiations led by the 
OSCE Minsk Group and it has funded complementary people-to-people projects. This 
provides credibility to the OSCE process. The EU also plays a limited role in SSR, through 
its focus on judiciary reform. Other international organizations, including the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe address different aspects of SSR (respectively police and judiciary 
projects). While the effort of the broader international community is largely 
complementary, there is certainly scope for more effective cooperation. 
5.4. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Armenia is a country with difficult neighbourly relations. Most significantly, it has been in 
conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh for nearly 30 years. The territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally considered part of Azerbaijan, but the Armenian 
ethnic majority has been ruling the territory as a de facto independent state. Ever since 
the Russian-brokered ceasefire of 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in prolonged 
peace talks in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and 
the United States (De Waal 2010). This remains the principal platform for the peace 
negotiations. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently considerably 
deteriorated as a result of the four-day April 2016 war, which led to several hundreds of 
casualties (Broers 2016; Crisis Group 2017). The conflict has resulted in a Primat der 
Außenpolitik. Domestic politics in Armenia is heavily influenced by it. 
Relations with Turkey are only slightly better. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Cornell 1998). Furthermore, Turkey does not recognise the Armenian 
Genocide by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. As a result, there are no diplomatic relations 
between Armenia and Turkey and the border remains closed. Russia, which is the main 
guarantor of Armenia's security – including through the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) – has its 102nd military base located close to the Turkish border. While 
a normalisation process was foreseen between Armenia and Turkey with the Zurich 
Protocols signed in 2009, the protocols where never ratified as a result of domestic 
opposition in both states. Normalisation of relations nevertheless remains the ambition of 
the international community, also sponsored through project funding. Particularly the 
potential opening of the border post would present welcome economic relief for Armenia. 
Armenian relations with Georgia and Iran are considerably better. Even though Georgia 
supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, for Armenia, it is the only gateway to 
global commerce. Furthermore, Georgia presents in several respects a positive example 
for Armenia. For instance, a European diplomat notes that while Georgia has almost 
successfully completed visa liberalisation with the EU, Armenia is about to start talks on 
this topic.  The relations with Iran are good. Somewhat paradoxically, Iran openly 70
supported Christian Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh worried about Azari nationalism within 
Iran. Following the Iran nuclear deal of 2015, and the unfreezing of the sanctions, Armenia 
has high hopes for Iranian investment and an upgrading of the border infrastructure. This 
was underlined during a visit of the Iranian President to Armenia on 21 December 2016 
(Joint Statement of the President of Armenia and President of Iran 2016). 
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In light of the challenging geopolitical position of Armenia, it is not surprising that the 
engagement of the international community has been relatively low-key. The OSCE Minsk 
Group, and its three co-chairmen, has the monopoly on the peace negotiations and offers 
channels for quiet diplomacy between Yerevan and Baku regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
EU (and UN) strongly supports the OSCE Minsk Group including through regular statements 
and other diplomatic efforts. They do not engage in their own peace initiatives. The EU, 
and the rest of the international community, largely focus on people-to-people exchanges 
both between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey. 
Because of the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan, it is difficult for Armenia to engage 
domestically in SSR, let alone demobilisation and disarmament. The limited SSR projects 
relating to the military tend to focus on human rights and democratic control. SSR policy 
with respect to the police is more extensive and run by the OSCE with an emphasis on 
introducing community policing. The EU and several member states have projects focusing 
on the judiciary and anti-corruption efforts. Indeed, corruption is high on the agenda of 
donors, as corruption is endemic and Armenia has not made significant improvements over 
the last two decades in this respect.  The UN family largely focuses on development 71
issues. 
5.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
Russia remains the most important international actor in Armenia. Through both the CSTO 
and its military presence, it is the ultimate guarantor of the Armenian state. And Armenia 
has proven, by and large, a loyal subject. For instance, it was one of the ten countries 
siding with Russia on the UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine (along with Belarus, North Korea, Syria and others). This 
strategic alliance does not necessarily make the Russo-Armenian relations cordial: Armenia 
understands it has no choice. For instance, in a surprise move, under Russian pressure, it 
walked away from a potential Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement with the EU in 2013. It signed up to the Eurasian Economic Union instead 
(Paul and Sammut 2016; Kostanyan and Giragosian 2016; Stronski 2016). Public confidence 
in Russia was, however, undermined by the April War, with Armenia considering that Russia 
provided insufficient support.  It resented also that Russia had sold advanced weaponry to 72
Azerbaijan, which was now used at Armenia's expense.  
The OSCE Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on 
the 'Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference', Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, take 
the lead role in the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The OSCE is a logical 
institution to address this conflict. As a collective security organisation, which includes 
the relevant stakeholders, it is the best forum for negotiations. The drawback of the OSCE 
is that it does not have the resources, leverage or visibility of the EU and UN. The EU, 
however, cannot take a lead role in peace negotiations due to the position of Russia and 
the geopolitical implications. The EU has also not shown a clear interest in getting 
involved (De Waal 2010: 174). Armenia has furthermore a fraught relation with the UN (see 
below). 
The Minsk Group itself is a rather opaque institution. While it consists on paper of a small 
dozen stages plus Armenia and Azerbaijan, in practice it is run by the co-chairmen, which 
have their occasional meetings with the two parties, but not with Karabahk 
 According to the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Armenia ranked consistently 71
low (2015: 95/168 [35]; 2010: 123/178 [2.6]; 2005: 88/158 [2.9]; 2000: 76/90 [2.5]; the absolute score of 2015 
is not comparable due to a change in methodology).
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representatives. The Group nor the co-chairs ever met in Minsk (De Waal 2010: 161). The 
discussions between the two parties and the co-chairs are secret and the process is hardly 
transparent. This has the advantage that the meetings allow for a channel of quiet 
diplomacy between the parties and a possibility to cool off. The flip-side is that it 
prevents the parties from making concrete progress, let alone preparing their own citizens 
for the required compromises. Apart from the peace talks, the OSCE also has a limited role 
and capacity in monitoring the conflict: ambassador Kasprzyk and five monitors routinely 
deploy to the Line of Contact in Nagorno-Karabahk and write up a report (De Waal 2010: 
160, 166).  
Entirely separate from the Minsk Group, the OSCE office in Yerevan provides bilateral 
support in line with the three pillars of OSCE policy: the politico-military, economic and 
environmental, and the human dimension. Given the presence of larger developmental 
actors (e.g. UN/World Bank), the emphasis on the first and third pillar.  Under the third 73
pillar, the OSCE office engages in a range of activities of which support for 
democratisation and elections is important. While the actual election monitoring is carried 
out by a separate and independent branch of the OSCE, the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which sets up its own shop in the run up to 
elections, the OSCE office is active in following up on ODIHR election recommendations as 
well as supporting the local government with electoral law. 
With respect to SSR, the OSCE activities under the politico-military dimension are the 
most important. In the context of the conflict with Azerbaijan, SSR is constrained and does 
not include demobilisation and other sensitive issues. Instead, SSR in the military domain 
is limited to strengthening the oversight by parliamentary committees, through workshops 
and study trips, and on human rights. In the area of the police, the OSCE leads on SSR by 
introducing community-based policing.  This includes helping to establish police outreach 74
stations. The OSCE has also focused on the Armenian police training centre, the police 
college and the police academy. To counter corruption and establish the police as a 
profession, it has insisted on an admission committee which includes an OSCE staff 
member. The OSCE relies on the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF) for experts. It is furthermore important to note that these SSR activities 
remain modest in terms of scope and budget.  75
In the area of security, the EU plays second violin. With respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh, 
its main instrument is the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia. The team 
of the EUSR includes a single policy officer in Yerevan (and another one in Baku). The EUSR 
does not have an independent role in the conflict and supports the OSCE Minsk Group. 
Through the regular back-to-back visits between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EUSR is in a 
position to provide a limited channel of quiet diplomacy between the highest levels (Paul 
and Sammut 2016: 3).  One problem is that the EUSR has little leverage with the parties. 76
EU funding is largely run through the bilateral EU Delegations. Both countries do not have 
an Association Agreement, which would be in any event negotiated by a different branch 
of the EU executive. The EUSR does lead on the European Partnership for the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). This multi-million project 
(2010-date), funded through the IcSP, focuses on civil society and people-to-people 
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Initiative, International Alert, Kvinna till Kvinna, and LINKS).  77
In addition to, yet separate from, the work of the EUSR, the EU Delegation in Yerevan has 
several engagements in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It runs a 
people-to-people project for exchanges between Armenia and Turkey through the Armenia-
Turkey Normalisation Process (ATNP), which is largely similar to EPNK and also funded 
through the IcSP. More significant is project support under the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument and its dedicated Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia 
(2014-2017) (European External Action Service and European Commission n.d.). One of the 
three priorities is justice section reform. This includes providing support for the drafting 
of new legislation that strengthens the independence of the judiciary. The EU also 
provided funding to build 12 court houses across Armenia ('Piotr Switalski: “Armenia is not 
just a neighbour but part of the European family”', 2016). The EU furthermore helped to 
upgrade the infrastructure at the border crossings between Armenia and Georgia, as well 
as improving the road between the border and Yerevan (EU Delegation n.d.). 
The Council of Europe also plays a role in Armenia through a range of projects related to 
human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. In the area of justice, it focuses on 
penitentiary reform and probation by making its specialised expertise available (Council of 
Europe 2015). The largest amount of SSR funding of the Council of Europe comes from the 
EU through the CoE/EU Eastern Partnership Programmatic Co-operation Framework 
(Council of Europe 2015: 29). In addition to the Council of Europe, there are a range of 
specialised NGOs, such as the Geneva-based DCAF, and bilateral development programmes 
which have SSR projects.  
The role of the UN family is largely limited to its development agenda in Armenia. The 
background is political. As a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
Azerbaijan has utilised the 'islamic solidarity' c(l)ause to rally against 'aggression by the 
Republic of Armenia' and the OIC has adopted several resolutions to that effect. Azerbaijan 
escalated the situation when it introduced UN General Assembly resolution 62/243 of 14 
March 2008 on 'The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan'. While the 
resolution passed with 39 votes in favour and 7 votes against, an exceptional 100 UN 
member states abstained from voting. Importantly, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group 
voted against. This resolution exemplifies the difficulty for the UN and Armenia to engage 
in a political way. That having been said, the Department of Political Affairs in New York 
takes an interest. Furthermore, UNHCR helped to address the refugee situation resulting 
from the April War.  78
5.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
While interviewees uniformly commented on the good collaboration of the international 
community in Armenia, there are hardly any formal mechanisms for liaison and there is 
only a limited interaction between the international organisations. The division of labour 
is largely tacit and based on both path dependence (i.e. who came first?) and specialised 
expertise. Perhaps also because the international engagement is relatively small, actors 
do not get into each other's way and provide largely a complementary effort.  79
The most explicit forms of a division of labour are on both extremes of the security-
 Interview #24.77
 Interview #26.78
 The Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia (2014-2017) of the EEAS and European Commission 79
(n.d.) includes in an annex a table providing an overview of the division of labour between donors in Armenia.
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development nexus. It is uncontested that the OSCE Minsk Group leads the peace 
negotiations. This creates a focal point for other international actors. For instance, any 
time the co-chairmen meet, the EUSR flies in to have consultations with all actors in the 
margins of the meeting. At the other side of the spectrum, the development agencies have 
clearly worked out profiles. Local donor coordination follows standard UNDP template, 
which is present is most development countries across the globe, and also involves the 
local authorities. There is no formal coordination between the OSCE, EU and Council of 
Europe in the area of security sector reform. Consultation takes place on a bilateral basis, 
particularly when co-funding or extra-budgetary EU project funding is involved. 
5.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES 
Despite the limited formal agreements between the international organisations, there is a 
relevant exchange of 'capabilities' between international actors and we can identify 
several dependencies. Most important is that the OSCE Minsk Group derives its continued 
authority from the international community, most notably the three co-chair countries but 
also other international organisations, such as the EU/UN. These international 
organisations provide explicit support for the OSCE-led process and offer several 
complementary activities in support of the peace process. In addition, the EU funds 
various SSR projects that are implemented by other international organisations. 
First of all, it is important to recognise the public and diplomatic support that the EU and 
the UN provide for the OSCE Minsk Group. This gives the OSCE additional authority as the 
only feasible forum for negotiations. For instance, High Representative Federica Mogherini 
has attended all three OSCE Ministerial Council meetings during her tenure and has made 
explicit reference to Nagorno-Karabakh in her statements.  Similarly, during the April War, 80
she noted that “The European Union fully supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group 
and the three Co-Chairs” (Mogherini 2016a). Similarly, UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman (2016) stated, during a visit to Armenia shortly after the 
April War, that “There is no alternative to a political process as proposed by the Minsk 
Group Co-Chairs and to restore trust between the sides”. Such public support by other key 
international organisations is significant, also because it shows the two parties that there 
is no alternative. 
Second, through the EUSR, the EU provides an additional channel of communication 
between the highest political and societal levels in Armenia and Azerbaijan (Paul and 
Sammut 2016: 3). This complements the irregular activities of the OSCE co-chairmen and 
the work of Ambassador Kasprzyk. In 2016, the EUSR paid six visits to Armenia, which are 
normally scheduled with back-to-back visits to Azerbaijan. During those visits, the EUSR 
meets with key political leaders, including the powerful Armenian President. This allows 
the EUSR to address the concerns of the day and convey the EU position on these matters 
and, if necessary, to calm things down. 
Third, the EU and its member states provide various 'flanking' measures for the Minsk 
Group through the EPNK project, and indirectly ATNP. It is widely recognised that, apart 
from the peace negotiations between the political leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
public and societal outreach is required to make a potential deal sustainable (so-called 
Track II diplomacy) (Montville 1987; Diamond and McDonald 1996; De Waal 2010). The risk, 
after all, is that the peace deal ultimately fails to be implemented, because of local 
 e.g. in Hamburg: “the European Union calls for re-engagement in good faith on the basis of proposals put 80
forward by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs” (Mogherini 2016b).
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factions and domestic political considerations.  The OSCE, however, has a restricted 81
mandate with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh and a limited budget.  It cannot therefore 82
engage in any extensive confidence-building projects or civil society outreach. The EU 
usefully contributes in this regard. 
Finally, it is also widely recognised that if Armenia and Azerbaijan were to reach an 
agreement, the implementation would probably require a lot of donor money (to 'buy off' 
the affected parties) and likely a peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (to credibly 
monitor implementation and keep the parties apart). While no plans are explicitly on the 
table or being discussed, it is well-known (and regularly repeated to the parties) that the 
EU would be ready to make significant financial contributions. Furthermore, it is generally 
thought that the United Nations would be the most appropriate actor to deliver 
peacekeepers. As the credibility of a peace plan depends on both commitments, one can 
see this as indirect support to the OSCE process as well. 
With respect to SSR, there seems to be an informal division of labour, in which the OSCE 
focuses on police and military reform, while the EU and Council of Europe are active in 
the area of rule of law and justice. The Council of Europe has become the implementing 
partner of choice for the EU in these areas, with the EU making 90% of the funding 
available for co-financed projects (Council of Europe and European Union n.d.). While the 
EU is also the largest funder of OSCE extra-budgetary projects in general, the EU does not 
significantly support the OSCE office in Yerevan in terms of SSR. The OSCE staff, in 
particular, feel they are underfunded and recall with some nostalgia the times that the EU 
provided significant funding for the OSCE projects. Combined with the fact that OSCE staff 
is on significantly lower salaries, this can give rise to mistaken perceptions and friction. 
 Many Armenian politicians, for instance, are either from Nagorno-Karabakh or have fought there. National 81
elections partially revolve around the question of which politicians take the strongest position on the conflict. 
Furthermore, following the April War, and several subsequent peace efforts, pro-Nagorno-Karabakh groups took 
seven people hostage in a bank in Yerevan for two weeks in July 2016, demanding the resignation of the 
president. This unprecedented event is an indicator of the difficulty that any normalisation of relations would 
pose for domestic societal relations. Armenian society has simply not been prepared for any concessions on 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 Ambassador Kasprzyk has a budget of 1.2m euros for his mediation and monitoring activities. The budget of 82
the OSCE office in Yerevan is for bilateral support. The OSCE has no presence in Baku, after the mandate of 
the project coordinator expired in 2015 (Azerbaijan closed the OSCE office in 2014).
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6. CONCLUSION 
International organisations require civilian capabilities for their increasingly substantial, 
varied, and complex civilian missions. International organisations, including the EU, UN 
and OSCE, have worked hard since the end of the Cold War to improve their civilian 
capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding (Dijkstra, 
Petrov and Mahr 2016). Yet international organisations rarely deploy their capabilities 
alone. They are almost always part of a broader international presence. This is for good 
reason. The different international organisations bring different strengths to the table, 
such as different sorts of civilian capabilities. There is thus scope for synergies and 
complementarities, something which the EU clearly recognised in its Global Strategy 
(European Union 2016). In this report we specifically study such synergies by analysing to 
what extent do the EU and other international organisations exchange civilian resources 
in target countries? To get detailed insights into such synergies, we have conducted case 
studies informed by on-the-ground interviews in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. We have 
studied relations between the EU and the various actors in those conflict areas, including 
the informal and formal division of labour, mechanisms for cooperation and resource 
exchanges and dependencies. 
When comparing the different cases, we have observed that the effort of the EU and other 
international organisations and actors in crises across the world is largely complementary. 
There are naturally occasional conflicts between the EU and its partners. For instance, 
during the politically charged moments of mission handovers, such as the handover from 
UNMIK to EULEX in Kosovo in 2008 and 2009, technical discussions over the demarcation of 
mandates and which actors can use which equipment and facilities have the potential to 
quickly become political stumbling blocks. Yet even in the case of Kosovo, the EU and UN 
found a modus operandi relatively quickly. Both on the side of the officials from the 
international organisations themselves and on the side of the member states there was 
little interest in conducting petty politics and institutional rivalry for a long time. 
It is often said that cooperation on the ground is easier than at the headquarters. And 
indeed, we have noticed that particularly in crisis regions, there is a strong attempt at 
unity of effort. At the same time, there is much potential for further synergies between 
international actors and organisations. We found that a joint strategic approach among 
international actors for conflict regions and countries is missing. When complementarities 
are being achieved, they are largely implicit and the result of parallel (civilian) missions 
rather than a truly collective and integrated approach. Coordination on the ground, by 
contrast, seems to focus on operational and tactical issues, such as deconfliction. A more 
strategic joint approach is not something one can assign separately to the headquarters or 
the field missions of international organisations. And naturally the different command and 
control structures pose significant challenges. But throughout the three cases we found 
that a strategic approach was lacking. This leads us to our first policy recommendation:  
Policy recommendation 1: The joint strategic approach of international actors 
and organisations to conflict countries should be strengthened. Despite 
complementarities, international actors continue to work alongside each other 
and coordination on the ground is often limited to operational and tactical 
issues. Strategic discussions, including at headquarters, should be better 
coordinated with other international partners. 
When it comes to a joint strategic approach, something that is often insufficiently 
recognised in Brussels and local EU missions is the weight of the EU as a political and 
diplomatic actor. Officials in countries across the world listen to the EU because it is the 
EU. The EU should use this political and diplomatic leverage much more to back up its 
  36
                              DL 4.2 Partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding       
international partners. Armenia is a prime example. With respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, for instance, the conflicting parties have repeatedly questioned the lead role of 
the OSCE in mediation and the composition of the Minsk Group. The EU’s (and UN) strong 
diplomatic statements in support of the Minsk Group have, however, made clear that the 
OSCE is the only game in town, which in turn has given the OSCE considerably more 
authority. It is worth repeating that a simple statement or press research from Brussels 
carried significant weight in various conflict countries. 
Policy recommendation 2: The EU should further recognise the importance of 
political and diplomatic support for the activities of other international 
organisations. Backing up partners, for instance through statements from 
Brussels by the High Representative or the Council or on the ground by the local 
EU missions, can have significant effects at limited cost. It increases the 
authority of international partners. 
Cooperation between international organisations, at headquarters and on the ground, 
takes place through both formal and informal channels. We noticed that there is 
significant variation across the case studies in how formal and informal channels are 
established and operationalised. In Kosovo, for instance, significant formal coordination 
mechanisms are present, but they are a relic of the UNMIK past when UNMIK was an 
umbrella organisation that involved different international organisations. The ICO was 
supposed to take charge of coordination after independence in 2008, but since it was only 
supported by the recognising states, it was in a compromised position from the very start. 
In Mali we have also seen some formalisation of cooperation, albeit to a lesser degree. The 
EU and UN, for example, have made liaison arrangements, which is an indicator of 
formalisation (Dijkstra 2017), but in practice this has not worked out sufficiently well. In 
Armenia, there is no 'donor' coordination in the area of security and all coordination goes 
via the local authorities. 
Formal coordination therefore varies on paper and in practice, and overall it is typically 
sub-optimal for political reasons. It is therefore often complemented by informal channels 
for coordination. In Kosovo, for instance, it was noted that bilateral lunches between the 
heads of mission seem to be the most important forum for coordination. This also directly 
shows the drawback of informal coordination. While informal channels can often be 
efficient (Gebhard and Smith 2015), they are also largely people-driven and their quality 
depends on personalities. They are also less inclusive than formal channels. When it comes 
to coordination, it cannot be either/or. International organisations need both formal and 
informal channels, and the EU is wise to invest more in both. This leads to the following 
policy recommendation: 
Policy recommendation 3: There is a need for both formal and informal 
coordination channels between international actors and organisations in crisis 
regions. Informal channels rely on personalities, while formal channels can be 
limited in scope. Successful coordination requires both. Even when formal 
coordination meetings are perceived as less useful, EU officials are well-advised 
to make the investment and attend them at the appropriate level. 
Our research has also shown that international organisations exchange resources 
extensively. At the same time, the exchange in civilian capabilities between the EU and its 
international partners tends to be limited to financial resources, diplomatic and political 
support for each other, and information exchange (with the exception of EU-NATO Berlin 
Plus military cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina). The EU member states do make 
considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as the UN 
and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context, which naturally reduces EU 
leverage. While member states probably like it this way as they are keen to preserve 
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control over their own capabilities, it is worth stating that the idea of an EU clearing 
house has been repeatedly mentioned in official documents. In any event, it would be 
good, also for individual member states, to link staff deployments to international 
organisations to general EU objectives in security policy. More recently, we have seen 
more ambitious resource exchanges directly between the EU and other international 
organisations. In Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely extensively on the UN mission 
support structure in the future. This is particularly promising as the UN has significant 
service centres, warehouses and general mission support. It would be important to 
examine whether such a model can also be applied elsewhere. In the military sphere, for 
all its unrelated difficulties, the EU-NATO Berlin Plus cooperation is an obvious example. 
As we noted in a previous report (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr 2016), civilian capabilities 
include finance, staff resources, equipment and mission support. It may be beneficial to 
expand the exchanges beyond finance. In an earlier section of the report, we noted 
various strategic coordination meetings between the EU and other international 
organisations, such as the EU-UN Steering Committee. These would be the obvious forums 
to discuss more elaborate exchanges. 
Policy recommendation 4: The exchange of resources between international 
actors and organisations largely centres around funding and information 
exchange. There could be further efficiency gains through resource exchange 
in other domains, such as staff, equipment, and mission support. This could be 
discussed during the strategic coordination meetings, such as the EU-UN 
Steering Committee.  
Despite its best efforts, the EU does not always think in political and strategic terms 
about its contribution to the broader international community. For instance, it is not clear 
that it sufficiently leverages its financial contribution to other international organisations. 
Part of the problem is the EU's and the EEAS's institutional fragmentation, in which 
entirely different sets of actors are responsible for funding and policy. This is not only the 
gap between Brussels and the theatre. On the ground, different EU actors may coordinate 
themselves, but they rarely use each other’s leverage in any meaningful way. For instance, 
CSDP missions and EU delegations tend to operate alongside each other, as in the case of 
Kosovo or Mali. In Kosovo, EU institutional fragmentation was highlighted as a weakness in 
a damming EU Court of Auditors (2012) report and our interviews show that this is still a 
challenge. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the work of the EUSR for the South Caucasus is 
barely supported by the EU Delegations on the ground (even though staff of the EUSR is 
co-located in the delegation). While there may be good political reasons to keep activities 
separate, without doubt, much of the EU leverage, particularly in the neighbourhood, 
comes from its trade policy and neighbourhood funding.   
Policy recommendation 5: There needs to be a more strategic approach to how 
the EU leverages its resources. As a result of institutional fragmentation within 
the EU and even within the EEAS, the funding of other international 
organisations does not necessarily result in political gain. This requires better 
intra-EU coordination and clearer lines of authority within the EEAS and its 
delegations. 
Finally, the EU should be more aware of the negative perceptions it occasionally creates 
among other international organisations. There is often a gap between what the 
international community and local actors expect from the EU and what it actually 
delivers. The EU is typically seen as a major and wealthy international actor. Small-scale, 
token-like, EU missions are, in this respect, not always appreciated, particularly if some 
other international organisations make major efforts in a crisis. Similarly, it is important 
that the EU makes use of its deployed capabilities rather than constraining its capabilities 
with caveats. For instance, in Mali, the EU head of mission could not visit the UN 
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commander due to security restrictions. Also, it is important to understand that an EU 
presence can create resentment among the staff of other international organisations, who 
typically have much lower salaries and whose organisations are poorly funded. OSCE 
officials in Armenia talk with some nostalgia about the time when the EU provided them 
with a multi-million euro project for democratisation, for instance. If the EU wants to 
contribute to the work of the international community, it needs to be more aware of its 
presence and privilege and engage in public diplomacy, also among other international 
organisations, and try to manage expectations better. 
Policy recommendation 6: The EU should monitor how it is perceived by other 
international organisations to avoid damage to its reputation and to improve its 
inter-organisational public diplomacy. A general perception is that the EU does 
not always use its significant resources to the fullest extent, while other 
international organisations are pushed to their limits with fewer resources. 
  39
                              DL 4.2 Partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding       
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
All interviews took place on the basis of informed consent and anonymity. Due to the small number 
of officials, it is not possible to provide more detail on the affiliations without disclosing identities. 
“European Union” includes the EEAS, Commission, Parliament, and Council Secretariat. 
“International organisation” includes the UN, NATO and OSCE. 
# Affiliation Type of organisation Interview date
1 Non-EU NGO NGO 1 February 2017 (Kosovo)
2 International organisation Governmental 2 February 2017 (Kosovo)
3 European Union Governmental 2 February 2017 (Kosovo)
4 Kosovo authorities Governmental 27 March 2017 (Kosovo)
5 Journalist Governmental 27 March 2017 (Kosovo)
6 International organisation Governmental 29 March 2017 (Kosovo)
7 International organisation Governmental 29 March 2017 (Kosovo)
8 Kosovo authorities Governmental 30 March 2017 (Kosovo)
9 European Union Governmental 30 March 2017 (Kosovo)
10 International organisation Governmental 30 March 2017 (Kosovo)
11 Kosovo authorities Governmental 2 February 2017 (Kosovo)
12 International organisation Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
13 International organisation Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
14 International organisation Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
15 International organisation Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
16 International organisation Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
17 European Union Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
18 European Union Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
19 European Union Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
20 Member state Governmental 23-30 November 2016 (Mali)
21 Expert Think tank 19 December 2016 (Armenia)
22 International organisation Governmental 20 December 2016 (Armenia)
23 International organisation Governmental 20 December 2016 (Armenia)
24 European Union Governmental 21 December 2016  (Armenia)
25 Member state Governmental 22 December 2016  (Armenia)
26 International organisation Governmental 22 December 2016  (Armenia)
27 International organisation Governmental 22 December 2016  (Armenia)
28 Member state Governmental 22 December 2016  (Armenia)
29 Member state Governmental 21 December 2016  (Armenia)
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